End-to-end (E2E) verifiability is critical if e-voting systems are to be adopted for use in real-world elections. A new E2E e-voting system doesn't require additional setup assumptions and uses conventional cryptographic building blocks.
I
n an end-to-end (E2E) verifiable election system, voters can verify that their vote was properly cast, recorded, and tallied into the election result. Such systems intend to intuitively capture voters' ability to detect when malicious election authorities might be misrepresenting election outcomes.
E2E verifiability mandates that voters be allowed to obtain a receipt after the ballot-casting procedure. This receipt lets them verify that their vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast, and tallied as recorded. Furthermore, any external third party should be able to verify that the election procedure was properly executed. In fact, it's imperative that an E2E system be delegatablethat is, voters should be able to outsource verification to any interested third party, such as an international organization that they trust, to aggregatively perform verification. This requirement, along with voters not being able to use their receipt as proof of the way they voted (to deter vote selling and buying), makes designing E2E verifiable systems challenging.
Currently, e-voting systems that offer E2E verifiability support it only under specific setup assumptions, such as a trusted party that provides a stream of unbiased and unpredictable random coins (a randomness beacon) or a trustily generated common reference string (CRS), or that operates under the random oracle (RO) model. For example, E2E verifiability can be argued-but never formally proven-for Helios, 1 which uses the RO model, or for Remotegrity 2 and Scantegrity II, 3 which use a randomness beacon. More general approaches to defining auditable multiparty computation have been proposed recently but still rely on a setup assumption such as a CRS. 4 Using setup assumptions to establish E2E verifiability in e-voting requires putting faith in the setup assumption itself and, thus, in the election result. This can lead to an unfortunate state of affairs: because the election authority (EA) can't unequivocally convince voters that the election is correct, the election outcome is always subject to dispute.
Our E-voting System
Motivated by this problem, we designed a new e-voting system for which we can prove E2E verifiability information theoretically without any setup assumption except a bulletin board (BB) that provides a consistent global view of the election. The requirement for BB consistency is a tight condition. Without it, E2E verifiability An Efficient E2E Verifiable E-voting System without Setup Assumptions of the election can't be achieved: by controlling the BB, an adversarial EA could distribute voters to their own separate "islands," within which each voter would have a verifiable view of an election result that might, in reality, be completely skewed. This allows for the possibility of independent execution attacks in networks without any authentication mechanism. 5 Another strength of our system is that we make the absolute minimal assumption about voters' computation capabilities: no cryptographic operations on the voter side during ballot casting. (Note that the auditing stage after the election would require cryptographic operations, but these are optional and can be performed at any time.)
Our construction draws on previous works' ideas, specifically, code-voting and double ballots 6 and secret-sharing homomorphisms 7 but also introduces novel elements that enable us to prove E2E verifiability. For more on why other E2E systems haven't worked, see the "Existing Techniques for E2E Verifiability" sidebar.
To achieve verifiability, our system collects coins from the voters to form the challenge (one random coin per voter). Given that a certain proportion of voters is honest and properly follows the protocol, the sequence of voter-contributed randomness has sufficient entropy to be used as the challenge of zero-knowledge protocols. Applying these techniques, we prove information theoretically our scheme's E2E verifiability. Furthermore, we utilize complexity leveraging to show that our system offers voter privacy.
Since publishing "End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model," 8 we've simplified the E2E verifiability definition. Under the new security framework, we prove E2E verifiability information theoretically while assuming the hardness of a well-studied cryptographic problem (decisional Diffie-Hellman [DDH] assumption) for voter privacy.
Building Blocks
We now describe the election notions and functionalities that our system realizes with cryptographic tools. Similar building blocks can be found in other systems. 1, 9 Here, we use the term negligible to denote that a value gradually becomes very small with respect to the increase of a system's parameters. Formally, negligible refers to a real function f(n) : ℕ→ℝ over the integers that's asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial in n.
Implementing an Electronic Envelope
To correctly count votes while preserving privacy, we deploy a commitment scheme to realize an electronic envelope that is both binding, in that an adversary can't open the envelope to a value different from the originally enclosed message, and hiding, in that an adversary obtains no information about the enclosed message
Existing Techniques for E2E Verifiability
T o further establish our approach's strengths, it might be worthwhile to demonstrate how previous works failed to attain end-to-end (E2E) verifiability without a setup assumption.
Helios culminates a long line of previous schemes that employ homomorphic-type voting 1,2 and uses the Benaloh challenge 3 as the fundamental mechanism to attain verifiability. By design, Helios requires voters to utilize a voter-supporting device to prepare a ciphertext; after an indeterminate number of trials, voters cast the produced ciphertext. Such ciphertexts are homomorphically tallied, and thus, they should be accompanied by a proof of proper computation. However, such proofs can only be proved interactively, which is insufficient because a corrupt election authority (EA) together with a corrupt voter might cook up a malformed proof that's indistinguishable from a proper one. Instead, Helios adopts a random oracle (RO)-based proof, thus imposing the RO restriction on the adversary during an E2E verifiability attack.
On the other hand, Remotegrity and Scantegrity require randomness that must be obtained from a randomness beacon to prove that the result is correct. It's easy to verify that the system is insecure in terms of E2E verifiability if the randomness beacon is biased. As in the Helios system, 1 the only active parties are the EA and the voters, who can't implement the randomness beacon required in the construction.
Our construction offers a new paradigm in e-voting design: the randomness needed to verify the election can be distributively collected from the entropy that the voters' interaction with the system generates. This entropy is internal with respect to the election environment and therefore eliminates the need to trust an outer source of randomness or restrict the adversary under the RO model. In our system, we utilize lifted ElGamal encryption to instantiate a commitment scheme. Hence, the commitment scheme inherits the ElGamal cryptosystem's security properties. Namely, ElGamal's perfect correctness implies the perfect binding property against adversaries of unlimited computational power. Moreover, ElGamal's semantic security implies the hiding property against computationally bounded adversaries, assuming the hardness of the DDH problem for the underlying encryption group.
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Generating Electronic Envelopes for Valid Votes
In our system, the messages that need to be enclosed under the ElGamal commitment scheme are valid encodings of a candidate from a list P 1 , …, P m . We encode candidate P j as the unit vector e j ∈ Z m , where the jth position is 1 and the remaining m -1 positions are 0. For example, in the case of three candidates P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 , the candidate encodings are (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (0, 0, 1), respectively. A commitment to e j is a vector of m commitments in one-to-one correspondence with the components of e j . Hereafter, we refer to vector commitments to denote a componentwise vector of commitments to a vector of messages.
Facilitating Secure Vote Counting
Besides binding and hiding, the lifted ElGamal commitment scheme is additively homomorphic. Namely, multiplying two commitments for messages M 1 , M 2 under the same commitment key ck produces the following commitment for M 1 + M 2 :
In addition, if (M 1 , r 1 ) and (M 2 , r 2 ) are the opening data for Com ck (M 1 ) and Com ck (M 2 ), respectively, then the opening data for the homomorphically added commitment
Homomorphic additivity naturally extends to multiple vector commitments. Hence, it allows all votes enclosed in the electronic envelopes to be tallied as if they'd been added within a large envelope. The large envelope depicts the homomorphic product vector commitment consisting of m ElGamal commitments to the components of the tally vector T : = (t 1 , …, t m ), where t j represents the number of votes for the jth candidate. In turn, the large envelope can be opened to T. The tally is performed without revealing the individual votes that summed to it.
Proving Ballot Validity
Our system's verification mechanism checks whether the envelopes (commitments of the votes) included in the tally are well-formed; that is, they enclose the valid encoding of some candidate to a unit vector. This is done by utilizing a special case of interactive zero-knowledge proofs, called Σ-protocols. In a Σ-protocol, a prover Prv with some private input w interacts with a verifier Vrf to convince it of the validity of some statement x. More formally, Prv and Vrf are modeled as interactive Turing machines, where Prv is unbounded and Vrf runs in polynomial time. The statement validity is expressed as x belonging in some NP language ℒ, and Prv's private input is typically a witness w for x. The interaction comprises three moves. In the first move, Prv sends to Vrf a commitment message Σ (1) . In the second move, Vrf provides Prv with a challenge ρ. In the third move, Prv replies with a response Σ (2) . Given its whole view of the protocol, Vrf must output an accept or reject message.
A Σ-protocol satisfies the following three properties:
■ Completeness. Vrf always accepts the proof of Prv for every valid statement x ∈ ℒ. ■ Soundness. Vrf doesn't accept the proof of a potentially malicious prover Prv * for some invalid statement x ∉ ℒ, except from some negligible soundness error probability ϵ.
■ Honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK).
There's an efficient simulator that, for every x ∈ ℒ, can simulate a valid transcript (Σ (1) ), ρ, Σ (2) ) without accessing the witness.
In our system, we adopt disjunctive Chaum-Pedersen (CP) proofs, 10 which are Σ-protocols for proving that an ElGamal commitment commits to a unit vector. Specifically, for every vector commitment C, we show that it commits to a valid encoded vote: for each m component of C, we generate a CP proof that the component commits to a bit value. Then, applying the additive homomorphic property, we generate a CP proof that the components' product is a commitment of 1.
long as the min entropy of the challenge string provided by the verifier Vrf is at least κ bits.
Syntax and Threat Model
Building on our original syntax and threat model, 8 we use λ as the security parameter. By = {V 1 , …, V n } and = {P 1 , …, P m }, we denote the set of voters and candidates, respectively, whose sizes n and m are polynomial in λ.
For simplicity, we consider an abstract centralized EA that administers the election's setup, vote casting, and tally phases. This is consistent with our definition of E2E verifiability in an all-malicious setting, where the EA is adversarially controlled.
Regarding vote privacy, we require the EA to be honest, because it's fully aware of the encoding of the voters' candidate selections. We later show how to distribute the EA to a set of trustees.
Syntax
The entities involved in an e-voting system are ■ the EA, which prepares all the election information, distributes the voters' ballots, collects the votes, computes the tally, and announces the election result; ■ the voters = {V 1 , …, V n }, possibly equipped with vote-supporting devices (VSDs) and audit-supporting devices (ASDs); and ■ a publicly accessible and consistent BB, where the election result and all audit information are posted.
There are four phases to e-voting: election setup, vote casting, election tally, and auditing. Figure 1 illustrates how the e-voting entities interact at each phase.
Modeling E2E Verifiability
An attacker's adversarial goal is to cause a system to deviate from the intended tally while still successfully auditing the election. Given that the candidates are encoded as unit vectors and the tally is represented as a vector in Z m , we measure tally deviation via the d 1 metric derived by the ℓ 1 -norm, ∥⋅∥ 1 scaled to half:
′ is the ith coordinate of R, R′, respectively. Figure 2 presents our E2E verifiability threat model. We consider an adversary that controls the entire election by corrupting the EA and all the VSDs. In addition, the adversary can control up to a certain number of voters and their devices.
We provide the following definitions. Definition 1. Let R ∈ Z m be the announced result in an election run by an E2E verifiability adversary . Let 
ELECTRONIC VOTING
R h ∈ Z m be the partial result derived by the honest voters' intended votes, that is, how the honest voters wanted their votes to be counted. We say that causes tally deviation δ if, for every possible partial adversarial result R * ∈ Z m , it holds that
Namely, it's impossible to explain the adversarial votes, so they produce a tally within a radius δ from R.
Consider an election with voters V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 and candidates P 1, P 2, and P 3 , where voters V 1 and V 2 vote for P 1 Hence for every possible partial adversarial result R * ∈ Z m , it holds that d 1 (R h + R * , R) ≥ 1, which implies tally deviation 1 (switching one vote).
Definition 2. An e-voting system achieves E2E verifiability with error ϵ for at least θ honest voters and tally deviation δ if the probability that an adversary causes tally deviation δ while all θ honest voters verify successfully is no more than ϵ. Remark 1. We've simplified our original definition 8 
Conversely, consider the optimal extractor ℇ * that outputs an adversarial result R * that minimizes {R′ | d 1 (R h + R′, R)}. Given the failure of the E2E verifiability definition, 8 an adversary * wins ℇ * , hence it holds that d 1 (R h + R ℇ , R) ≥ δ. Consequently, adversary causes tally deviation δ and definition 2 doesn't hold.
Modeling Voter Privacy
We model voter privacy by capturing coercion resistance against adversaries that passively monitor the voting procedure and request voter transcripts after vote casting, including receipts. Such an adversary can corrupt all the voters' devices and schedule network traffic. It might also control a number of voters. However, the EA delivers the voters' private inputs via untap pable channels. Figure 3 shows our voter privacy threat model.
Recall that an adversary can also obtain an honest voter's transcript and receipt. To deceive the adversary, honest voters must be able to lie about their interaction with the system by providing fake views that are indistinguishable from the actual ones. Definition 3. An adversary has negligible advantage against privacy if, for an election, it has only negligible additional probability to output the correct honest voters' votes compared to the trivial advantage.
Consider the previous example where three honest voters V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 vote for P 1 , P 1 , and P 3 and produce the tally (2, 0, 1). The same tally would derive if V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 had voted for P 3 , P 1 , and P 1 or P 1 , P 3 , and P 1 ; that is, there are three ways in total. Then, has negligible advantage against privacy if the probability of outputting the votes of V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 is no more than 1/3 + ϵ, where 1/3 is the probability of randomly guessing the votes and ϵ is a negligible term. 
Definition 4.
We say that an e-voting system achieves voter privacy for at most t corrupted voters if any probabilistic polynomial time adversary that controls up to t voters has negligible advantage against privacy.
System Description
In this section, we describe an e-voting system for 1-outof-m elections.
Data Structure
Before the election, voters receive a voting card via a secure untappable channel. Figure 4 illustrates such a voting card's basic structure. Each card has a serial number (SN) and two functionally equivalent parts, side A and side B, which each contain an unpredictable authentication code and list the candidates with their corresponding vote code.
To enable verifiability, the EA needs to post necessary information regarding the election process on the BB. As Figure 5 depicts, each ballot has seven columns and two rows. Column I states a unique SN, and column II shows side A and side B. Column III is for vector commitments. Columns IV and V are for the first and third moves, respectively, of the corresponding CP proofs for vector commitment validity. Column VI reveals some of the openings of the vector commitments in column III. Finally, column VII marks the voters' submitted vote codes. Notice that columns V, VI, and VII are only partially filled, which we clarify later.
Election Setup
The EA first generates a commitment key ck and posts ck along with the other public election information, such as the election question, to the BB. For ℓ ∈ {1, …, n}, the EA then generates the metadata for ballot ℬ ℓ , as follows.
For x ∈ {side A, side B}, the EA picks a random number r ℓ,x ← Z m ; the EA then commits an m-ary unit vector
, where the r ℓ,x th coordinate is 1 and the rest of the coordinates are 0. We denote this vector commitment as C ℓ,x . After that, the EA computes the first move of the CP proofs, denoted as
∑ , showing that the vector commitment C ℓ,x indeed contains a unit vector. For j ∈ {1, …, m}, the EA sets the vote code of the jth candidate as O ℓ,x,j = j -r ℓ,x -1 (mod m); namely, the vote code is the offset of the jth candidate by r ℓ,x -1. (The vote codes on each side of a ballot are essentially a cyclic shift of the canonical ordering, that is, 0, 1, …, m.) Finally, for each ballot ℬ ℓ , the EA generates a random authentication code and produces the corresponding voting card ℓ as in Figure 4 . Meanwhile, the EA posts information about columns I, II, III, and IV to the BB as depicted in Figure 5 (phase 1) and keeps its state. After election setup, the voting cards are distributed to the voters via a secure untappable channel such as the postal service.
Vote Casting
Having obtained the voting card, voter V ℓ can cast a vote once the election starts. To cast a vote, V ℓ randomly selects a side to use, say side A. On side A, the voter looks for the intended candidate's vote code, say 2. The voter then inputs the authentication code to a VSD and, after authentication, utilizes the VSD to send the side and vote code, A-2, to the EA. After casting a vote, V ℓ keeps the unused side (side B) of the voting card and 
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the submitted message (A-2) as the receipt, denoted as α ℓ (see Figure 6 ).
Election Tally
After the election, the EA marks column VII on the BB according to the received votes. For each cast ballot ℬ ℓ , the EA performs cyclic right shift on the corresponding vector commitment according to the submitted vote code. Note that the resulting vector commitment, denoted as C′ ℓ , should only contain 1 at the j ℓ th coordinate, where the j ℓ th candidate is the intended choice of voter V ℓ . Let be the set of all voters who cast a vote. For all ℓ ∈ , the EA entrywise multiplies C′ ℓ , obtaining a vector commitment of the final tally, denoted as E. The EA then posts the decommitment of E to the BB, opening E to the election tally T : = (t 1 , …, t m ), where t j represents the number of votes for the jth candidate.
Auditing
The voter V ℓ can use an ASD to audit the election regarding the BB information and receipt α ℓ . More specifically, the voter checks that ■ the annotated column VII content is consistent with the side and vote code submitted; and ■ the opened vector commitment in column VI is consistent with the unused side of the voting card. More precisely, let u be the opening of the vector commitment. If we apply cyclic right shift to u according to the printed vote code (see Figure 4) for the jth candidate, then the resulting opening is the unit vector e j .
Moreover, V ℓ or any third-party auditor can use an ASD to check that on the BB ■ all the CP proofs and commitment openings are valid, and ■ the announced tally is consistent with the decommitment of E.
Security
Here, we demonstrate our system's E2E verifiability and how the voting card format, generation, and distribution, as well as the security of the applied cryptographic tools, serve to protect voter privacy.
E2E Verifiability
We stress that our E2E verifiability theorem holds information theoretically in the standard model. However, before stating the theorem, we list plausible attacks against our system's verifiability, describing their effectiveness and detection probability at a high level. For simplicity, we've excluded trivial attacks-those that would be readily detected, such as malformed or unreadable election transcripts. The major types of attacks that adversaries might launch are as follows:
■ Invalid encoding. An adversary creates an option-encoding commitment to some invalid value, that is, a nonunit vector that doesn't encode a legitimate candidate selection (for example, multiple votes for a specific candidate). This attack can be prevented by the soundness of the CP protocol, except from the negligible soundness error. The proof verification is done via a trusted ASD. ■ Voting card attack. The information on an honest voter's voting card side is inconsistent with the respective audit data committed in the BB; for example, the vote code-candidate correspondence is altered. The tally deviation achieved from this type of attack is at most 1 (by switching the voter's vote). The probability of detection is 1/2, because the voter chooses to audit using the inconsistent voting card side with a probability of 1/2. ■ Clash attack. 11 Adversaries instruct y honest voters to point to the same BB location by providing them with voting cards indexed under the same SN. This creates y -1 empty BB locations that adversaries can associate with injected votes of their choice. During auditing, all y voters verify the correct counting of their votes by auditing the same information on the BB and, hence, miss the injected votes producing the tally deviation. The deviation achieved by this attack type is y -1, whereas the detection probability is 1 -2 -(y-1) . This is because the attack succeeds only when all y voters choose the same voting card side to vote with, which happens with 2/2 y = 2 -(y-1) probability.
Remark 2. The above list exhausts all possible attack strategies against our system in our threat model; in the case where the ballot information is tabulated using all valid commitments in the BB without being deleted or replaced, adversaries can perform only a combination of voting card attacks and clash attacks on the honest votes. If no such combination occurs, then all honestly cast votes are in correct (yet unknown) one-to-one correspondence with the BB audit data; hence by the perfect binding property of the ElGamal commitment scheme, the opening of the homomorphic tally matches the intended result.
Theorem 1. Our e-voting system achieves E2E verifiability for at least θ honest voters and tally deviation δ, with error 2 -θ + 2 -δ .
Proof. Let be an adversary that allows at least θ voters to be honest and audit while it causes tally deviation of at least δ. Consider the following two cases.
Case 1.
Assume that performs at least one invalid encoding attack. Each honest voter contributes 1 bit of entropy by coin flipping, thus the generated challenge for the CP proofs will have at least θ bits of min entropy. By proposition 1, the soundness error of each CP proof is 2 -θ , hence the probability that succeeds is bounded by 2 -θ .
Case 2. If performs no invalid encoding attack, then all cast votes are legitimate. Therefore, the adversarial votes will produce an acceptable partial result R * ∈ Z m included in the election result R that announces. By definition 1,
where R h is a partial result derived by the honest voters' vote intention. Therefore,
where now R -R * is the partial result produced by homomorphically tallying all the honest ballots that (acting as a malicious EA) marked for counting. The latter suggests that at least δ honest votes were altered via combined voting card and clash attacks. We showed that in voting card or clash attacks, an increase of tally deviation by 1 implies a drop of success probability by 1/2. Therefore, by combining these attacks, has no more than 2 -δ probability of achieving a tally deviation of at least δ.
By taking the disjunction of the two cases, 's strategy has no more than a 2 -θ + 2 -δ success probability.
Voter Privacy
In the following theorem, we demonstrate how our system protects voter privacy. Theorem 2. Assume there's a constant c, 0 < c < 1 such that any adversary running in 2 λc -time can't break the hiding property of the underlying ElGamal commitment scheme. The e-voting system achieves privacy for at most t corrupted voters for any t = λ c′ for any constant 0 < c′ < c.
Proof. Recall that the voting cards are delivered to the voters via a secure untappable channel. Therefore, when the EA is honest, the adversary doesn't know the link between vote codes and candidates. Hence, the adversary gains no information about honest voters' choices by eavesdropping on their cast vote codes.
In addition, voters can lie about their views, consistent with the passive coercion resistance property. The voting cards aren't authenticated-they merely display a correspondence between the candidates and integers from 0 to m -1 that can be generated and printed by any party. Thus, voting cards can be faked and provide no proof of how the voter voted.
As a result, the only system component the adversary can still attack is the cryptographic payload: the ElGamal commitments and the CP proofs. Owing to the HVZK property, the CP proofs reveal no information about the intended vote associated with the ballot. And owing to the hiding property, the ElGamal commitments, which act as electronic envelopes, don't leak information about the enclosed candidate. It's easy to show that any adversary can break the hiding assumption of the ElGamal commitment with less than 2 λc running time if it breaks privacy for t = 2 λc ′.
Our System in the Real World
Our proposed e-voting system has already been fully implemented and applied in several use cases. A pilot experiment during the May 2014 European elections (747 participants) tested its usability and people's trust in the system. During the January 2015 Greek national ELECTRONIC VOTING elections (400 participants), another pilot experiment studied the effect of E2E verifiability support on people's trust in the system. Our system also serves as the fundamental component of the platform supporting the electronic democratic procedures of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece, one of Greece's largest work unions.
Distributing the EA
In our security model, we consider the EA a single entity that's malicious in the verifiability game and honest in the privacy game. In practice, you might want to distribute the EA to subauthorities that collectively implement the EA functionality to improve the privacy property's resiliency. Our voter privacy notion can be easily extended to allow corrupted subauthorities in the same way that an adversary controls corrupted voters.
In our system's real-world implementation, we distribute the EA to a setup authority, a vote collector, and a set of trustees T 1 , …, T k . During election setup, the setup authority prepares all the ballots and voting cards. After that, the setup authority distributes its private state as k shares to T 1 , …, T k via a verifiable secret-sharing scheme. This allows the trustees to jointly open the tally and complete the necessary CP proofs after the election. When the setup is finished, the setup authority's working tape is destroyed, and the election run is privacy preserving as long as at least one trustee isn't corrupted.
Thanks to this design, our system achieves E2E verifiability in an all-malicious setting and voter privacy as long as at least one trustee remains honest.
Humans as a Source of Randomness
For simplicity in our security analysis, we assumed that all honest voters who engage in an election run with our system will flip a fair coin and always verify the election. In this idealized setting, at least θ honest voters generate at least θ bits of entropy that implies the 2 -θ + 2 -δ error bound in E2E verifiability proven in theorem 1. Nonetheless, in a real-world execution, we can't expect such idealized human behavior. To approximate an actual election setting, we made the following relaxations:
■ the voters flip biased coins that have min entropy at least h ≤ 1, and ■ the voters will perform audits with some probability at least p ≤ 1.
By binomial distribution properties, and without getting into the technical details, we can show that the E2E verifiability error is now
for any p ≤ 1/2 (which is what we could expect in the real world). Clearly the error in Equation 1 is upper-bounded by 2 -θ + 2 -δ , for the special ideal case where h = p = 1. In Figure 7 , we provide the error bound regarding total min entropy hθ for tally deviation δ = 100 and various p values. If we normalize tally deviation per the number of voters, say n = 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000, the deviation is δ/n = 1, 0.1, and 0.01 percent, respectively. Hence, the impact of an attack with a certain success probability diminishes rapidly as we move toward large (national)-scale elections.
From our pilot data, we deduced that voters chose to use side A to vote approximately 85 percent of the time. If we treat the voters' behavior uniformly (which can Figure 8. E2E verifiability error bound regarding normalized tally deviation δ/n for at least n/2 honest voters with parameters h = 0.234; p = 2.8 percent; and n = 10,000, 50,000, and 100,000 voters. /n Error probability n =10,000 n = 50,000 n =100,000
be argued for based on the assumption that adversaries don't know the history of every individual's behavior), a min entropy per voter of h = -log(max{0.85,0.15}) ≈ 0.234 is implied. In addition, the ratio of participants who audited the bulletin board was p = 2.8 percent. In Figure 8 , we plot the probability error for the specific values h, p with regard to normalized tally deviation δ/n and various electorate sizes, given that most voters are honest (otherwise the adversary can completely manipulate the result). We observe that, even in this pessimistic scenario, the probability that the election integrity is violated beyond δ/n = 1 percent is less than 10 -6 for n = 100,000 (the same probability error holds for δ = 0.1 percent and n = 1,000,000).
W e presented here an efficient E2E verifiable e-voting system without an RO or external trusted random source. In the proposed system, the EA performs all the cryptographic operations, and voters need only submit a vote code to cast their vote. Such a design not only simplifies the VSDs' functionality but also ensures voter privacy even when VSDs are compromised.
